Quine and the indeterminacy of translation

The two arguments for indeterminacy
Soames states the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation as follows:
Translation is not determined by the set N of all truths of nature, known and unknown. For any pair of languages and theory of translation T for those languages, there are alternative theories of translation, incompatible with T, that accord equally well with N. All such theories are equally true to the facts; there is no objective matter of fact of which they disagree, and no objective sense in which one is true and the other is not. (243) As Soames says, there is an issue concerning what 'determines' means, let alone Quine's understanding of it-more of that shortly.
Soames identifies "two main routes in Quine's writings to the indeterminacy thesis" (244). The first route makes essential use of Quine's behaviorism, and the argument is basically this: Argument 1 1. If translation is determinate (i.e., if translation is determined by all truths of nature), it is determined by the behaviorial truths.
Translation is not determined by the behavioral truths.
Hence: 3. Translation is indeterminate.
Responding to this argument, Soames concedes that "publicly available observable behavioral facts-in particular, facts about stimulus meaning…don't determine which translations of our words are correct" (244). That is, premise 2 is true. The culprit, Soames says, is premise 1, which rests on Quine's behaviorism. In the first place:
In other domains of empirical investigation, we routinely countenance nonobservational facts the existence of which is supported, but not logically or necessarily guaranteed, by the observations we make. To rule these out in the case of our theories of mind and language-in advance of establishing his indeterminacy theses-Quine would have to have a compelling independent argument that the only facts in these domains of inquiry are behavioral facts (which we may assume to be observable). Since, as far as I can see, he has no such argument, there is reason not to rest his case for the doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation on behaviorism (244).
And in the second place, the appeal to behaviorism creates trouble elsewhere in Quine's system, because his crucial notion of stimulus meaning, which characterizes the evidence for a theory of translation, is "defined in terms of assent and dissent" (244), and it is unclear how assent and dissent can be given behavioristically acceptable explanations. As Soames notes, on the face of it assent to a sentence is explained in terms of one's belief that the sentence is false, which invokes unhygenic mental vocabulary. 2 Soames is of course right to identify these two problems. The first is wellknown, and I will say more about it in the following section. The second is less 4 familiar-and is an example of how Soames always manages to find something novel to say about discussed-to-death philosophers. But perhaps this second problem is not insuperable (from Quine's perspective, at least). The behaviorist substitute for believing that sentence S is true will be (roughly) this: being disposed to produce S. We may assume this is acceptable, since the second problem does not concern behaviorism in general. Then the behaviorist substitute for assenting to S will presumably be (roughly) this: the subject's behavior (bodily movement) is caused (in part) by the subject's having the disposition to produce S. (Cf. Quine 1974, 47; 1992, 39 .) Thus, if the subject waves her tentacles, and this is (in part) caused by her having the disposition to produce S, then the subject assents to S.
If we can help ourselves to the negation of S (not-S), then dissenting to S does not pose an extra problem, since it is (near enough) equivalent to assenting to not-S. Unfortunately not-S is off-limits, because negation (in the subject's language) is supposed to be explained partly in terms of dissent (cf. Quine 1960, 57-8; 1974, 75 ; see also Soames, . But even if dissent is junked as behavioristically unacceptable, we can state non-trivial empirical constraints on translation just in terms of the affirmative stimulus meaning of sentences, defined in terms of assent. These constraints can be supplemented with Quine's "partial criterion" of dissent: "a speaker will dissent in no circumstances sufficiently similar to those in which he volunteers the sentence" (1974, 47) . Thus, if a translation manual translates expression e of L as meaning the same as not in English, then the speakers of L will not assent to e^S in circumstances sufficiently similar to those in which they assent to S. If this means that the translation of the truth functional connectives is indeterminate, so be it (cf. Quine 1974, 78) .
In any case, I think Soames should have given the first route to the indeterminacy thesis more of a run for its money, because I doubt that the second, "more powerful and more widely influential route" (246), can be extracted from what Quine says. The second route, Soames explains, drops behaviorism entirely, because:
[w]e can no more read off the contents of a person's words from physiological claims about neurons than we can read off the contents of his words from statements about the noises he makes in certain circumstances.
Consequently, it seems that if we cannot deduce a determinate meaning from a non-intentional description of linguistic behavior, adding facts about neurons won 't help. (246) In other words, if premise 2 of Argument 1 is plausible, the stronger premise that translation is not determined by the physical truths (which include, but are not limited to, the behavioral truths), is also plausible. We can now trade the stronger version of premise 2 for a weaker version of the problematic premise 1, yielding the following argument: Argument 2 1. If translation is determinate (i.e., if translation is determined by all truths of nature), it is determined by the physical truths. Perhaps Quine did not mean to stress learning, but if he didn't, then it is hard to find an argument in this passage (which certainly purports to give one).
Still, there is something tempting about the conclusion, even if we set aside language acquisition as irrelevant. Davidson, in particular, is persuaded:
Perhaps the most important thing [Quine] taught me was that there can be no more to the communicative content of words than is conveyed by verbal behavior. This seems obvious to many people: "meaning is use", quoth
Wittgenstein. The idea is obvious, but its full force is still mostly We may fairly suppose that the slogan that "meaning is use" can be motivated without appeal to language acquisition. If we take talk about how words are "used" as a suggestive but initially unexplained bit of jargon, then the Quinean argument-template for the indeterminacy thesis could be put as follows:
Argument Q 1. If translation is determinate (i.e., if translation is determined by all truths of nature), it is determined by the truths about how expressions are used.
2. Translation is not determined by the truths about how expressions are used.
Hence:
3. Translation is indeterminate.
Argument 1 is an instance of Argument Q, with the "use" jargon explained in austere Quinean terms; this (arguably) trades the truth of premise 2 for the falsity of premise 1. At the other extreme, "use" may be explained in terms of meaning and reference-'rabbit' is used to refer to rabbits-yielding an instance of Argument Q that trades the truth of premise 1 for the falsity of premise 2. But perhaps an account of use somewhere between these two extremes could produce an instance that is (at least) not obviously unsound. For example,
McGee argues that a plausible case for indeterminacy can be made out even if use is "understood very broadly, so that it includes a word's employment in silent contemplation…" (2005, 400). 5 There may be more mileage in Quine's indeterminacy argument than Soames allows.
Elaborating and evaluating Quine's conclusion
In chapter 
Soames then draws out an apparent consequence of the reasoning that leads
Quine to inscrutability and C2, namely that "we may correctly assert that the native doesn't use 'gavagai' to refer to anything… [and] [s]ince there is nothing special about the native, or the word gavagai, we must conclude that no one ever uses a word to refer to anything" (264). 6 The argument Soames gives for this eliminativist conclusion does not purport to be Quine's; Soames notes that "Quine never explicitly says anything quite as radical and unequivocal" (264)). Still, Soames thinks the argument is one that Quine ought to accept. Further, in an especially illuminating reconstruction of a reductio ad absurdum argument from Quine's "Ontological Relativity", Soames argues that Quine's way of blocking the conclusion that "Reference… [is] nonsense not just in radical translation but at home" (Quine 1969b, 48 ; quoted by Soames at 265) must be to "deny that any word refers to rabbits (and only rabbits)" (269). Now Quine thinks that if we "explicate" reference in "disquotational paradigms" (as he thinks we should), then we can say that "'rabbit' denotes rabbits, whatever they are, and 'Boston' designates Boston" (Quine 1992, 52;  quoted by Soames at 272). But here, Soames plausibly argues, Quine is best understood as proposing a substitute for our ordinary notion of reference. If we use 'refers Q ' for the Quinean substitute, and 'refers' unsubscripted for "our 13 ordinary notion of reference" (270), then Quine holds (according to Soames) that 'rabbit' refers Q to rabbits but does not refer to rabbits.
Soames then argues that "Quine's position has several consequences that are so unpalatable as to make it reasonable to regard it as self-undermining" (282). The last of those consequences is this:
[T]he very existence of Quine's own assertions, his own beliefs, and his own arguments is sufficient to falsify that which he asserted, believed, and argued for. What he asserted, believed, and argued for has the character that the very act of asserting, believing, or arguing for it is itself sufficient to falsify it.
(284-5)
Soames's point is that Quine's (alleged) radical eliminativism-e.g. that no one ever uses a word to refer to anything, "that no one ever says or asserts anything"
(284)-is pragmatically self-refuting: if Quine succeeds in stating it, it is false.
This calls, I think, for a slight correction. Is Quine a radical eliminativist, holding that 'rabbit' does not refer to rabbbits, and so on? This interpretation does not fit well with Quine's repeated claim that there is "no fact of the matter". If
Quine holds that 'rabbit' does not refer to rabbits, then-despite his protestations to the contrary-there is "an objective matter to be right or wrong about" (Quine 1960, 73) .
Further, whether 'determines' means a priori implies, or metaphysically necessitates, if the truth of ''Rabbit' refers to rabbits' is not determined by the physical truths (or facts about use), then-it would be natural to hold-neither is the truth of its negation. And if so, then accepting the indeterminacy thesis does 14 not involve denying that 'rabbit' refers to rabbits, but rather rejecting ''Rabbit' refers to rabbits' (and its negation). Quine may escape the reductio of "Ontological Relativity" in a similar style. 7 Quine, then, can be seen as adopting something like Soames's "partial definition" model of vague predicates, but taken to extremes. On Quine's view, the "default determinate extension" of a predicate, "the set of things that…the conventions of the language (plus relevant nonlinguistic facts) determine that the predicate applies to" (Soames 1999a, 209 ) is the empty set.
Needless to say, although this reconstruction of Quine's position might be a hermeneutic improvement, it remains as unpalatable as before. And a version of pragmatic self-refutation is retained. Quine's view, we are supposing, includes the claim that 'Sometimes someone asserts something' is to be rejected, yet if
Quine succeeds in asserting this, there is a truth that his own theory enjoins us to reject.
Davidson on alternative conceptual schemes
Davidson's argument
The main thesis of Davidson's "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (1974) is that every possible language (used by a population) is translatable into English-which is a good candidate for explicating the Tractarian thesis that
he limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein 1961, 5.6) . 8 In
addition, Davidson argues that-as Soames puts it-"[t]ranslation into
English involves fundamental agreement with our world view" (314). Call this additional claim Fundamental Agreement.
Davidson's official topic is not translation, but "conceptual schemes", which he identifies with "sets of intertranslatable languages". Given this identification, Davidson's main thesis is that there are no alien conceptual schemes-schemes that are wholly or partly disjoint from the scheme shared by "all mankind" (1974, 198). 9 Explaining the plan of his paper, Davidson says:
In what follows I consider two kinds of case that might be expected to arise:
complete, and partial, failures of translatability. There would be complete failure if no significant range of sentences in one language could be translated into the other; there would be partial failure if some range could be translated and some range could not (I shall neglect possible asymmetries.)
My strategy will be to argue that we cannot make sense of total failure, and then to examine more briefly cases of partial failure. Since Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used, there does not seem to be much hope for a test that a conceptual scheme is radically different from ours if that test depends on the 16 assumption that we can divorce the notion of truth from that of translation.
(194-5; my emphasis)
Commenting on this passage, Soames says: [Davidson] seems…to suggest that we extend the concept of truth to include sentence of another language L by coming up with translations of sentences of L into English, and then using those translations to construct instances of Tarski's schema T to fix the specialized interpretation of the truth predicate that applies to sentence of L. Having gotten this far, he observes that this makes no room for the idea of true sentences not translatable into English.
Soames then argues that the appeal to Convention T is misplaced. One of his points is that Convention T has no particular connection with English. What is required is that sentences of the object language be translated into the metalanguage, the language in which the definition of truth for the object language is constructed; the metalanguage does not have to be English. This is too sketchy to be convincing-there may well be other ways of confirming the untranslatability hypothesis-but it arguably makes better sense of
Davidson's subsequent attack on partial failures of translation.
In any event, the verdict on total failure is not obvious. The allegedly untranslatable Saturnians are (presumably) rational agents with the usual stock of psychological states-if they aren't, then it is obscure how they could be speaking a language at all. Assuming that Saturnian can completely express the Saturnians' conceptual repertoire, the issue of untranslatability amounts to the difficult question of whether rational agents who psychologically resemble ourselves must also share some of our concepts-basic logical concepts, basic physical concepts, or whatever.
Partial failure, on the other hand, is considerably more tractable. Not only is Davidson's step from Fundamental Agreement to the impossibility of partial failure quite unpersuasive, but a passage from Soames (325) suggests an argument for the opposite conclusion. Let Mini-English be English without a chunk of vocabulary not definable in terms of the remainder: English minus its color vocabulary, say, or minus the vocabulary of set theory (which we may assume to be part of English). The argument (in outline) proceeds in two steps.
The first step should be fairly uncontroversial: there could be speakers of MiniEnglish (who, we may suppose, lack the conceptual repertoire to understand
English completely). This shows that there could be conceptual schemes that are subsets of our scheme. The next step of the argument attempts to show that there could be a scheme that stands to ours as ours stands to the Mini-English scheme-a superset of our scheme. That step is not entirely straightforward, but To what extent do they agree on the indeterminacy and inscrutability theses?
(See in particular Davidson 1979 .) Does Quine hold, as Davidson claims, the (allegedly unintelligible) "dualism of scheme and content", the "third dogma" of empiricism (Davidson 1974, 189) ? But that is not really a complaint-after reading Soames's excellent book, students will be in a position to make the comparison themselves. 
